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“A Flop or a Success?” An Evaluation of the Welfare Impacts 
of the 6-3-3-4 Education System in Nigeria 
 
The need for graduates who would be productive citizens able to contribute significantly to 
the Nigerian economy led to the overhaul of the old education system 6-5-4 and the 
implementation of the 6-3-3-4 system, with its first set of graduates from secondary schools 
in 1988. The main objective of the 6-3-3- 4 system was to produce self-reliant graduates with 
better labor market skills and earning potential. In this paper, we investigate to what extent 
this goal was achieved. Using a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design, we examine if 
graduates from the 6-3-3-4 system experienced an improvement in welfare compared to 
those from the old system. We measure welfare improvement using several indicators such 
as a decline in poverty likelihood and poverty gap, an increase in the probability of 
employment and an increase in wages. Our results provide some evidence that the new 
system led to a decrease in the likelihood of being poor compared to those who passed 
through the old system. We also provide evidence of higher wages for select participants. We 
do not find any consistent evidence that the 6-3-3-4 system increased the probability of being 
employed when we compare participants from both systems. Our results suggest that while 
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With the introduction of the New National Policy on Education in 1981, plans
were underway to overhaul the prior Nigerian education system. According to
Fabunmi (1986) the previous education system was deemed archaic and there was
need for a modern, dynamic and progressive educational system. These plans
gave birth to the 6-3-3-4 system. A system that allowed for six years in primary
school, three years in Junior Secondary School (JSS), three years in Senior Sec-
ondary School (SSS) and the last four years were for tertiary education. Previously
Nigeria had a 6-5-4 system, which represents six years in primary school, five in
secondary school and four years of tertiary education. Prior to 1980, there were
several debates on the inadequacy of the 6-5-4 system to prepare Nigerians to face
whatever challenges, including employment problems, they may come across in
future. These discussions and a general dissatisfaction with the 6-5-4 system were
the motivation for replacing it with the 6-3-3-4 system. One of the objectives of
6-3-3-4 was to produce graduates who would be able to make use of their hands,
heads and hearts. This implies an education that was more holistic, relevant and
one that should lead to higher human capital accumulation, economic growth and
improved welfare.
The move to 6-3-3-4 was not only about the change in the number of years
of secondary education (from 5 to 6), or the division of secondary education into
two parts with certifications at the end of each part. The system overhaul also
involved a radical change in the subject structure of education in secondary school.
Also at the tertiary level, a professional orientation was adopted to minimize
unemployment and produce skilled labor in science and technology. The 6-3-3-4
system was supposed to be a functional education meaning an education that as
noted in Uwaifo and Uddin (2009), allows those who pass through it function
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economically, intellectually, morally, politically and socially.
From the early 2000s about 20 years after the program was first rolled out,
there was an increase in debates among education policy makers and education
interest groups about the effectiveness of the education system. One view is that
the system if implemented correctly would yield success but in the Nigerian case
had not been implemented properly but still better prepared individuals for labor
market success than the previous system. Hence, individual who passed through
the 6-3-3-4 education embody more human capital than their counterparts who
passed through the 6-5-4 system. This view was championed by the late Prof
Fafunwa, the Minister of Education during the period of the system’s inception.
The other more commonly held view was that the system flopped and should be
overhauled as graduates via this system embodied less human capital and have
lower earning potential.1 The later more common view and sentiment about the
system finally led to its replacement 24 years after its inception with the new 9-3-4
system of Education [Universal Basic Education (UBE)] in 2006 which kicked off
formally in 2008.
Given the emphasis of the 6-3-3-4 education system was in producing self-
reliant citizens with a functional education, we examine in this paper to what
extent this goal was met with respect to improving welfare of individuals who were
exposed to the system compared to those who passed through the previous system.
Further, as the 6-3-3-4 system of education was supposed to be job-oriented and
mitigate the significant rate of unemployment and skill mismatch, we also examine
to what extent the system increased the probability of employment in comparison
to graduates of the former system. Using data from the 2010 LSMS survey on
1As noted in a national newspaper, January 14, 2004, Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Ahmadu Bello
University (ABU), Zaria and one of the architects of the 6-3-3-4 system of education in Nigeria,
Professor Ogunshola, reflects on his life at 80 and regrets the setback the system brought to the
nation’s education system in his provoking interview with Ayodeji Fashikun.
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Nigeria, that allows us to compares a sizeable number of individuals who passed
through both systems, we address two specific questions. First, does the 6-3-3-
4 system lead to an improvement in welfare of participants compared to those
who passed through the 6-5-4 system? Second, does the 6-3-3-4 system lead to
a higher probability of employment for its participants in comparison to those
who passed through the 6-5-4 system. We address these questions by calculating
local treatment effects employing a sharp Regression Discontinuity (RD) design.
We make use of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014)’s nonparametric based
inference procedure for estimating treatment effects in RD designs. We focus on
estimated treatment effects using a local polynomial estimator with a quadratic
local polynomial bias correction. For deducing inferences, we employ Calonico,
Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b) bias-corrected inference procedure which is robust
to large bandwidth choices.
We estimate treatment using the RD approach on the general sample and sev-
eral sub-samples. In particular we focus more on treatment effects on the sample
of individuals whose highest qualification is at the secondary level. Our rationale
for focusing on this group is the fact that most of the changes implemented with
the system overhaul affected secondary education. Moreover, some of the curricu-
lum change that accompanied the 6-3-3-4 system was geared towards individuals
who would be going from secondary school to the work force. Hence, most of the
discernable effects of the 6-3-3-4 system if at all they exist would be more evident
among those who received only a secondary qualification through this system.
Our results provide evidence that the 6-3-3-4 system led to welfare improve-
ments. In particular compared to individuals who were exposed to the old system,
we find that participants of the 6-3-3-4 whose highest qualification is at the sec-
ondary level have a 13.8% lower incidence of extreme poverty. We are also able to
deduce the potential source of this decrease in poverty from increased wages. We
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find about a 38.2% increase in wages for individuals with secondary qualification
who passed through the 6-3-3-4 system. We do not find consistent evidence that
the system led to an increase in the probability of being employed. However this
result does not suggest that the system change did not boost employment given
the significant population growth that directly increased the size of the cohort
exposed to 6-3-3-4. Rather finding no decline in employment probability in the
6-3-3-4 cohort, despite the increase in the length of the school to work transition
and the rapid population growth over time, may be viewed as a testament to
increased self-reliance among graduates from this system.
Our paper contributes to the literature by investigating empirically welfare
impacts of the 6-3-3-4 system in Nigeria using a RD design with bias correction
and a robust inference procedure. Nigeria has the largest population in Africa
and is home to a sizeable amount of human capital and manpower in Africa.
Given the role of education in manpower development and economic growth, an
evaluation of the effectiveness of one of its longest lasting education systems that
was replaced in 2006 with the UBE is important. Although past literature has
considered the 6-3-3-4 system and its deficiencies with respect to implementation,
there has not been any prior attempt to compare graduates via this system and
any other system in an empirical way. To the best of our knowledge, our paper
provides the first attempt at doing this. Moreover given recent conversations by
policy makers on the ineffectiveness of the 9-3-4 system and the need to return to
some variance of the 6-3-3-4 system, the need for an evaluation of this system is
expedient and timely.2 Our paper also contributes to the literature by highlighting
the need for policy makers to evaluate programs empirically before concluding
2The June 28, 2012 Vanguard Newspaper highlights this quandary on education systems in
Nigeria and the suggestion of the former Education Minister, Prof. Uqayyatu Rufa’i to revert
back to the 6-3-3-4 system.
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about their effectiveness. Though the 6-3-3-4 system was plagued with suboptimal
implementation, we show that the system was not totally a flop as is portrayed
in the past literature and echoed in popular media. Finally our paper contributes
to the general literature that evaluates education policies and programs. What
is unique about this analysis is that we consider a national system change while
most other analysis focus on local programs and specific education policy shifts.
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. In section two we provide more
information on the 6-3-3-4 system and briefly review the past relevant literature.
Section three is a summary of the data sets and descriptive analysis. Our empirical
model is highlighted in section four, and section five provides a detailed summary
of our finding and robustness checks. We summarize and conclude in section six.
1 Background and Relevant Literature
1.1 Background
A change in an education system is a huge undertaking that is both costly mon-
etarily but also imposes costs on individuals who are affected by the change in
the education system. Historically, countries do not change education systems
frequently but the Nigerian experience in particular has been somewhat different
given a change in education system twice in less than 40 years.3
Prior to 1982 Nigeria followed the 6-5-4 system which represents six years in
primary school, five in secondary and four in tertiary and in terms of curriculum
was very similar to the system inherited from the British via colonial rule. The
foundation for the 6-3-3-4 system was laid following the introduction of the New
National Policy on Education in 1981. The policy aimed at realizing a self-reliant
and self-sufficient nation to meet the country’s developmental needs and this major
3For a more in-depth historical perspective of early education systems in Nigeria, see Fafunwa
1974 and Imam (2012).
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reform in its education system was a significant part of how this policy objectives
were going to the achieved.
One of the motivation for the move to the 6-3-3-4 system was the dire need
for technological development in Nigeria to meet the challenges of the changing
global economy and the failure of the the 6-5-4 system to produce graduates
who could meet this need. Moreover the failure of the 6-5-4 system to produce
graduates who had relevant skills that increased employability or the possibility
of self-reliance through entrepreneurship provided further incentive to overhaul
the education system and introduce one that could fulfil this and other critical
objectives. Under the 6-3-3-4 system a student is expected to spend six years
for primary education, three years for JSS, three years for SSS and four years for
tertiary. The focus of the new education policy implemented in 1981 was to build
technical capacities of students right from secondary school level. This focus on
technical human capital accumulation at the secondary level has two advantages.
First it would increase the likelihood that secondary school graduates, who do
not go on to tertiary institution, will be able to make use of their hands, heads
and hearts and build self-reliance. An increase in self reliant secondary graduate
should reduce unemployment and improve welfare. Second as noted in Thovoethin
(2012), a focus on technical courses would better prepare students to better engage
in engineering and technological related courses and careers in tertiary institutions.
The 6-3-3-4 system made it possible for vocational education to be taught at
all levels of education. In particular the program focused on merging academic and
vocational education programs with an emphasis on acquiring vocational skills at
the secondary level. To realize this goal, at the Junior Secondary School (JSS)
level , vocational subjects such as home economics, introductory technology, busi-
ness studies and agricultural science were made compulsory for both sexes and
students also had to take English, mathematics, integrated science, social studies,
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fine art, health education, physical education and music. Further, a student is
expected to select a Nigerian language and to choose either Christian religious
knowledge or Islamic religious knowledge. At the Senior Secondary School (SSS)
level students are required to study English, mathematics, one science subject
and one Nigerian language. Other subjects are electives and students are sup-
posed to select based on their interest in Sciences, Social Sciences or the Arts.
The 6-3-3-4 system led to the introduction of a wide range of electives at the
SSS levels. Available subjects included biology, geography, literature in English,
commerce, physics, economics, chemistry, home management, food and nutrition,
computer science/typing, French, music, wood work, history, technical drawing,
auto mechanics, applied electricity, agriculture, arabic, government, accounting,
Christian religious knowledge, Islamic religious knowledge, metal work, visual and
physical education.4 The subjects offered through the 6-3-3-4 system reflect the
job-oriented objective of the system. As noted in Uwaifo and Uddin (2009) em-
phasis was placed on manual activities, technical proficiency, economic efficiency
and the respect for the dignity of labor.
At its inception the program had huge support and there were high hopes for
the program as it was viewed as noted in Uwaifo and Uddin (2009) a laudable pro-
gramme capable of ushering in an educational revolution in Nigeria and the right
direction, towards the technological development of the nation. Unfortunately, the
next 24 years did not seem to yield the expected outcomes. Anecdotal evidence
suggest that the program was a flop and as noted above, some individuals who
had championed its implementation came to view it as a wrong step for Nigeria
while others linked its lack of effectiveness to poor implementation.
4It is important to mention that not all schools offered all the above listed electives at the
SSS level. Hence students to some extent under the guidance of their parents, chose schools that
would offer the kind of electives they were interested in.
8
In 2006 amidst significant criticism of the 6-3-3-4 system but without signifi-
cant empirical research comparing its participant to participants of the prior 6-5-4
system, the system was replaced formally with the 9-3-4 system. At the core of
the newest system is the Universal Basic Education, (UBE) which involves 9 years
of uninterrupted schooling with an automatic transfer from one class to the other
(6 years of primary school education and 3 years of Junior Secondary School edu-
cation). This UBE is a replacement for the Universal Primary Education (UPE)
scheme of the 6-3-3-4 system of primary education. Two major change in the 9-3-4
system is the removal of the entrance exam to secondary school characteristic of
the 6-3-3-4 system and making 9 years of schooling free and compulsory compared
to 6 years of compulsory education in the 6-3-3-4 system and free schooling which
characterised the system from 1981-1999. The 9-3-4 is supposed to be designed
to conform with the millennium development goals (MDG) of basic education for
all.
1.2 Relevant Literature
Impact analysis of policy and programs has become quite common in the economic
and public policy empirical literature. In many cases education, welfare and health
related impacts of programs and policies are evaluated through an artificial ran-
domized experiment. An example of such a paper is Angrist and Lavy (2003) who
consider the effect of high school matriculation awards on education outcomes.
Another is Krueger and Zhu(2003) who investigate the effect of school vouchers in
New York. Similarly Rouse (1998) considers the impact on student achievement
of private school vouchers administered through the Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program. The effect of financial aid offers on college enrollment was also consid-
ered by Van der Klaauw (2002). Jacob and Lefgren, (2006) consider the impact of
remedial education on achievement and Matsudaira (2008) estimates the impact
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of mandatory summer school on student achievement.5
It is also worth noting that the literature evaluating micro-education programs
in developing countries has grown significantly over the last 10 years with the in-
crease in randomized trials in many developing countries. This increase in the
literature is especially true for research focused on the impact of micro or macro
programs and polices on education outcomes like enrollment, achievement and
education attainment. For example Kremer et al (2004) considers the impact of
different school inputs on learning in Kenya while Kremer and Miguel (2004) con-
sider the effect of deworming children on education and health related outcomes
also in Kenya. Another example is McEwan and Shapiro (2008) who consider the
benefits of delayed enrollment in Chile. In other scenarios, natural experiments
occur that allow us to estimate the impact of exogenously determined conditions
on socioeconomic variables we are interested in. Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King,
Elizabeth and Kremer (2002) consider private school voucher in Colombia and in
a follow up to this paper, Angrist and Bettinger (2005) consider the long term
consequences of the secondary school vouchers received by students. There are
also papers that have considered in a non-randomised setting, the impact of other
school related programs that are specific to a country or countries. For exam-
ple, Dynarski (2003) considers the consequences of merit aid, Andrabi, Das, and
Khwaja (2006) examine the effect of government girls schooling expansion in Pak-
istan on primary school enrollment during the 1990s, Howell and Petersom (2002)
investigate the impact of vouchers on the education gap, Duflo (2001) estimates
the impact of a school construction program on school attainment in Indonesia
and Krueger and Whitmore (2001) investigate the effect of attending small classes
at early grades on outcomes later on in life. Many of the aforementioned papers
found strong impacts of program or policy intervention on schooling outcomes like
5Other related papers include Angrist and Lavy (1999) and Ludwig and Miller (2007).
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enrollment, school attainment, school attendance or performance. However, not
all programs upon evaluation had the expected impact on schooling and health
related outcomes.
In contrast there is a smaller set of papers that examine macroeconomic pro-
grams and policies and their effect on welfare and labor market outcomes like
poverty reduction, reduction in risk of unemployment or returns to education.
For example the impact of PROGRESA (now called Oportunidades) in Mexico
on health, education and labor market outcomes has been examined extensively.6
Other examples that fit this sub-group are Jalan and Ravallion (2003) who exam-
ine the poverty impact of Argentina’s Trabajar workfare program and Gonzalez
and Uwaifo Oyelere (2011) who estimate the impact of Mission Sucre a nation-
wide education policy change in Venezuela on returns to education. Other related
papers that look at the effect of macroeconomic or institutional changes and the
effect on welfare and labor market outcomes include Fleisher et al (2005) who
link changing returns to education to reforms that came along with institutional
change and Uwaifo Oyelere (2011) who provides evidence of the impact of demo-
cratic reforms on returns to education in Nigeria.
In terms of papers that have evaluated education systems in Nigeria, the litera-
ture is scant. Specific papers that have discussed the 6-3-3-4 system include Uwaifo
and Uddin (2009) who examine the implementation of the technology subjects’
aspect of the 6-3-3-4 system of education using Ekpoma a city in Nigeria as a case
study. These authors find significant problems with program implementation and
also a deficit of personnel and materials to support the system. Another related
paper discussing why the system failed is Thovoethin (2009). This paper argues
6Papers examining effects on schooling include Schultz 2004; de Janvry (2006) and Todd and
Wolpin 2006. For labor-market outcomes for adults and youth see Behrman, Parker, and Todd
(2009).
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that the concurrent rise of private education at the early phase of the 6-3-3-4 led
to the system’s failure to meet its objectives. Imam (2012) reviews educational
policy in Nigeria since 1944, highlighting details about the 6-3-3-4 system and its
implementation. The three aforemention papers though useful do not evaluate
this system’s welfare impacts empirically although each provides some evidence
and (or) arguments about the documented problems/issues with the system. This
gap in the literature is one of the underlining motivations for this paper. We focus
on the impact of the education system change on individuals’ poverty risk, wages
and employability primarily because of the clear link between the 6-3-3-4 system’s
goals and objectives and these outcomes.
2 Data and Descriptive Analysis
2.1 General Data Description
For this analysis, we make use of the Nigeria General Household Survey (GHS-
Panel) 2010/2011 and the GHS 2010/2011 survey. The GHS is a cross-sectional
annual survey of households in Nigeria conducted by the Nigerian Bureau of Statis-
tics (NBS). In terms of coverage the survey covers the Federal Capital Territory
(FCT), Abuja and the 36 states. Within each state, both urban and rural enu-
meration areas (EAs) were sampled. In 2010 the survey was significantly revised
and a panel component was added. The 2010/2011 survey contains about 22,000
households. Its panel component is focused on 5000 households within the GHS
and covers multiple agricultural activities. Both the GHS general survey and the
GHS-Panel are nationally representative surveys which are representative at the
zonal (urban and rural) levels. According to the National Bureau of Statistics
(NBS), the focus of the panel survey is to improve data from the agriculture sec-
tor and link this to other facets of household behavior and characteristics. The
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revisions of the GHS survey as well as its panel components is a joint effort of NBS
partnering with the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMA
& RD), the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA), the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation (BMGF) and the World Bank. This panel component is focused on
getting better information on the role of agriculture in households’ economic well-
being. The panel aspect of the survey draws heavily on the Harmonized Nigerian
Living Standard Survey (HNLSS) and the National Agricultural Sample Survey
(NASS).
The GHS Panel consist of two survey stages the post-planting period and the
post-harvest period. The post-planting period survey took place late 2010 while
the post-harvest survey took place in 2011. The post-planting survey includes
22,000 households while the post-harvest survey includes just the panel sample.
The goal is for the GHS Panel to be repeated every two years while the GHS
Cross Section will continue to be carried out annually. The survey consists of
three questionnaires that cover a wide range of socioeconomic topics: the House-
hold Questionnaire, the Agricultural Questionnaire and the Community Question-
naire. In this analysis we will not be making use of the panel aspect of the GHS
data because our chosen methodology for answering our questions of interest does
not require panel data. However we will be focusing solely on the panel sample
of 5000 households and about 27,000 observations. The GHS 2010/2011 survey is
more detailed than previous GHS and covers a wide range of socio-economic topics.
We restrict ourselves to the 5000 panel sample because we focus on parts of the
post-planting and the post-harvest household questionnaire in this analysis. These
questionnaires contains information on observations’ demographic and migration
characteristics, education, labor market characteristics, credit and savings, house-
hold assets, non-farm enterprizes, household food and non-food expenditures, food
security and other non-labor income.
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2.2 Defining Treatment (Participation in the 6-3-3-4 system)
There is no question in the GHS survey that asks respondents specifically what
system of education individuals passed through. However we can easily infer
participation (treatment) in the new educational system based on time of birth.7
The typical age in Nigeria in primary one is 6 year and given the first group of
graduates from the 6-3-3-4 finished high school in 1988, assuming normal education
progress, we can deduce that these individuals were born in 1971. Hence we
allocate treatment (passing through the 6-3-3-4) to anyone who was born from 1971
onwards to 1999 and the non-treated are those born before 1971.8 This method
of allocating treatment has two potential limitations. First if someone happens to
have progressed through the education system at a faster rate than normal, they
may have been born in 1971 but not experienced treatment. This could happen
if the individual got double promoted (skipped a grade) in elementary school and
hence missed treatment. Skipping grades or getting double promoted in Nigeria
is not common so we do not worry about this potential limitation. In contrast,
some individuals born before 1971 may have repeated a grade in primary school
or began school a little bit older and hence experienced treatment but will be
wrongly allocated to non-treatment. This possibility is much more likely as grade
repetition though not very common occurs.9 More importantly, there is evidence
more so in rural areas than in urban that individuals may begin school at older
ages. If this happens, individuals born before 1971 who began school late can be
wrongly assigned to non-treatment and this could reduce the possibility of finding
7Hereon we would use treatment interchangeably with exposure, new program and participa-
tion in 6-3-3-4 and we will use the words control, non-treated and old program when referring to
those who passed through the 6-5-4 system.
8Those born from 2000 onward will pass through the 9-3-4 system. We do not consider these
individuals as they are 10 years or younger in our dataset and are not in our relevant sample for
analysis.
9About 4.5% of current students in our data have repeated a grade according to our data.
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significant effects. Later on in the paper we discuss how we address this potential
challenge.
2.3 Descriptive Analysis
In searching for evidence of welfare impacts of the 6-3-3-4 system, a good start-
ing point is to compare the distribution of per capita expenditure (PCE) for the
treatment group (those who passed through the 6-3-3-4 system) and our control
group (those who passed through the 6-5-4 system). Figure 1 highlights kernel
density distribution of PCE. Figure 1A captures the treated and control group
distribution for the general sample. While Figure 1B highlights the distributions
for a sub-sample. The sub-sample depicted here are those whose highest quali-
fication is at the secondary level and who are in the most relevant birth cohort
for our empirical analysis. Examining this sub-sample is useful because the effect
of treatment should be more easily discernable for those whose highest qualifica-
tion is at the secondary level and who are born in the same age cohort. A focus
on those with secondary qualification is important because most of the changes
implemented through the 6-3-3-4 education system affected secondary education
directly. In addition, our empirical strategy is based on a RD design which is fo-
cused on estimating average effect for a subpopulation, close to a set cutoff, which
in our case is a 1971 year of birth. The age cohort we restrict the sample in Figure
1b to is those born between 1966 and 1975. Both Figure 1a and 1b show a slight
rightward shift in the distribution for the treated. The slight rightward shift in
the distribution is more evident in the sub-sample.
This figure may suggests some possible welfare improvement for the treated
sample but given the closeness of the distributions, these figures do not provide
substantial evidence of welfare improvement from treatment. We also examine
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Figure 1: PCE Kernel Distribution for 6-5-4 and 6-3-3-4 System Participants
of exposure to treatment since higher human capital accumulation is an expecta-
tion from exposure to the treatment. Figure 2a and b highlight the kernel density
distribution of wages for the treated and control groups. Just as in figure 1 we
present distributions for the full sample and the aforementioned sub-sample. Fig-
ure 2a does not provide support for a positive shift in the wage distribution for the
treated group as a whole. However this is not surprising because wages increase
with experience and experience increases with age. Since the control group is older
than the treated group, finding the distribution of the control group slightly to
the right of the treated groups is consistent with the age earning profile. However,
the closeness of the distributions may be suggestive of some benefits from treat-
ment. Figure 2b which is focused on the sub-sample within the same age cohort
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we described above, provides some suggestive evidence of positive benefits from
6-3-3-4. The wage distribution of the treated restricted sample is slightly to the
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Figure 2: Log Wage Kernel Distribution for 6-5-4 and 6-3-3-4 System Participants
The last measure of welfare we consider in this descriptive analysis is employ-
ment. Figure 3 provides bar graphs of the share employed by treatment status.
Figure 3a provides shares for the whole population while Figure 3b provides share
for the same sub-sample, those with secondary level qualification and born in the
most relevant cohort for our analysis. Both figures suggest that the treated group
has a smaller share employed than the control group. However the difference is
significantly smaller when we focus on the sub-sample. These figures may suggest
that treatment did not increase the share employed. However rigorous analysis is
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needed to confirm this hypothesis. Furthermore, given the rapid increase in popu-
lation in Nigeria, the differences in means noted in Figure 3a and b do not suggest
that the treatment had no effect on employment. Instead what these differences
may capture is that the growth rate of population may not have kept pace with the
increase in opportunities for the treatment group who are younger and entered the
work force on average at a later time. Meaning that even if the 6-3-3-4 program
had positive effects in terms of boosting human capital and increasing earning po-
tential, if population grows much faster than expansion of output and employment
opportunities, the share employed might keep shrinking despite a larger absolute
number employed as a result of treatment. In our econometric analysis we make
use of a regression discontinuity design in an attempt to identify consistent effects
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Figure 3: Employment Share for 6-5-4 and 6-3-3-4 System Participants
Table 1 presents summary statistics by treatment and control observations
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by 6-3-3-4 and Old Program Participants
Panel A Panel B: Panel C: Those with Secondary
Age above 15 Those born 1966-1975 qualification born 1966-1975
6-5-4 6-3-3-4 6-5-4 Treated 6-5-4 Treated
Year of School 4.930 8.472 6.50 6.98 12.405 12.534
(5.840) (5.650) (6.104) (5.894) (1.351) (1.386)
Employed 0.837 0.59 0.885 0.864 0.927 0.880
(0.370) (0.492) (0.319) (0.343) (0.260) (0.326)
Per capita 82352.08 85154.58 82216.56 81082.72 102166.4 96360.73
expenditure (94806.64) (86723.16) (83132.76) (89678.88) (87679.71) (78370.12)
Female 0.483 0.552 0.558 0.571 0.367 0.460
(0.499) (0.497) (0.498) (0.495) (0.483) (0.499)
Household Size 6.267 7.001 7.13 6.95 6.23 6.136
(3.364) (3.438) (3.345) (3.253) (2.765) (2.852)
Age 54.47 25.75 41.01 36.41 41.165 36.49
(12.152) (6.887) (1.535) (1.616) (1.904) (1.5207)
Wage 38844.76 28766.09 31456.09 42177.93 37472.24 50318.79
(288590.1) (156143.4) (69090.81) (235536.1) (98743.29 ) (187559.2)
Urban 0.298 0.320 0.291 0.288 0.444 0.441
(0.457) (0.466) (0.454) (0.453) (0.498) (0.497)
Christian 0.550 0.539 0.494 0.502 0.685 0.704
(0.498) (0.498) (0.500) (0.500) (0.465) (0.457)
Married 0.818 0.463 0.900 0.884 0.911 0.812
(0.386) (0.499) (0.300) (0.320) (0.285) (0.392)
N 5916 8862 1302 1397 248 324
Note: The sample size differs on some of the variables considered like Wage.
for some key variables used in our analysis. Panel A summarizes results for the
whole sample used in our econometric analysis. Panel B summarises results for
the most relevant age cohort for analysis. Those born close to the first treated
sample. Panel C summarizes results for those whose highest qualification is at
the secondary level and in the most relevant age cohort. Some of the differences
between the treated and control sample are expected given exposure to treatment
depends on year of birth. For most of the variables highlighted not correlated with
age, we see similarities in means between the treated and the control sample. This
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similarity is more evident in panel B and C which has a sample of individuals closer
in age and more similar. For example for column (6), all the variables apart from
years of schooling and age are not statistically different for the treated and control
sample. In contrast for panel C years of schooling for the control and treatment
group are not statistically different. However share female, share married and
share employed are statistically different. We are interested in potential effects of
treatment on employment, wages and PCE. The results of our test of statistical
difference in mean wages, PCE and share employed do not suggest any difference
between the treated and control sample in the samples highlighted in panel B but
we find significant difference in PCE and share employed in Panel A. In contrast
in Panel C, we find significant difference in the share employed but no difference
in mean wages or PCE. This simple comparisons of means suggest that despite
the fact that the treated are younger than the control group, they are fairing no
worse on average in terms of wages and PCE. Furthermore, while Table 1 suggests
that the treated are less likely to be employed than the control group, this lower
employment may not be linked with program exposure but as explained above,
the rapid increase in population growth for younger cohorts might explain the
lower share employed for the treated sample. This would be the case if growth in
employment opportunities does not keep pace with growth in population. Table
2 highlights the estimates of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of poverty
indices p0 to p2 (see Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke et al 1984), as well as estimates
of the standard deviation of these indices. We present these indices by treatment
status. In panel A the estimates of these indices using the full sample above 15
is summarized while in Panel B the estimates using the sample born 1966-1975
is summarized. In panel C the estimates for the most relevant sub-sample were
effects should be most likely discernable as described above is summarized. To
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Figure 4: Head Count Measures of Poverty by Treatment Status
in all three panels that the share below the poverty line is lower for the treated
group than the control group which may be suggestive of some welfare effects of
the system change. This lower head count ratio or poverty incidence result is also
illustrated in Figure 3. For example, when the head count ratio is estimated using
the relevant sample of those born 1966-1975, we notice that about 48% of people
who passed through the 6-5-4 program are poor in contrast to just 47% of those
who passed through the treatment (6-3-3-4). In contrast if we look solely at those
with a secondary qualification within the same cohort, we find that 36% of the
control group are poor in contrast only 31% of the treated group are poor. Table
2 also highlights the poverty-gap measure P1 and the squared poverty-gap indices
P2 which captures the severity of poverty. Notice again similar trends in the
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poverty gap and poverty severity indices as with P0 when comparing the treated
and control samples. The results for the most part suggest a lower poverty gap
ratio for participants of the treatment system versus the old system. Similarly,
estimates in panel A and C suggest that the severity of poverty is on average
higher for participants in the old system than the 6-3-3-4 system.
Table 2: FGT Poverty Measures Estimation by Program Type
Panel A Panel B: Birth Cohort Panel C: Born 1966-1975
Age > 15 1966-1975 Secondary Qualification
Old Program 6-3-3-4 Old Program 6-3-3-4 Old Program 6-3-3-4
Head Count Ratio 0.455 0.439 0.480 0.471 0.359 0.312
(P0) (0.498) (0.496) (0.500) (0.500) (0.481) (0.464)
Poverty Gap 0.186 0.175 0.191 0.192 0.122 0.112
P1 (0.261) (0.255) (0.264) (0.266) (0.215) (0.216)
Poverty Severity 0.102 0.096 0.106 0.107 0.061 0.059
P2 (0.186) (0.181) (0.193) (0.195) (0.143) (0.155)
N 5916 8862 1302 1397 248 324
What can we infer from these descriptive analysis? First there is some prima
facie evidence that those who were exposed to the 6-3-3-4 system on average might
be less likely to the poor and have a lower poverty gap and severity. However
these improvements may not be substantial given the similarity in these indices
for both groups. Moreover, mean wages for the treated group though higher than
the control group in the relevant cohort, is not statistically different. Second, even
though the treated are on average less likely to be poor, they are less likely to be
employed than those who passed through the 6-5-4 system. It is important to
mention that the descriptive analysis highlighted above only provides evidence of
differences between the treated and control sample analysed. It cannot be used to
detect any causal effect of the program. However noting that the treated sample
is not fairing worse on typical welfare indicators is encouraging. Next we turn to
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our econometric analysis to identify potential system effects.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Identification and Estimation
In this paper we focus on two questions. First does exposure to the 6-3-3-4 ed-
ucation system lead to welfare improvement for participants compared to 6-5-4
participants? Second, do individuals who passed through the 6-3-3-4 have a higher
probability of being employed than their counterparts who passed through the 6-
5-4 system? To answer these questions we make use of a regression discontinuity
(RD) design. RD analysis is an intuitively appealing, rigorous nonexperimental
approach first suggested by Thistlewaite and Campbell (1960). It is used to eval-
uate causal effects of interventions. Typical scenarios that fit the RD approach
involve assignment to treatment based on a score at or above a certain cut-off. The
RD approach has been used to identify causal impacts in several papers includ-
ing Angrist and Lavy, (1999), Jacob and Lefgren, (2006); McEwan and Shapiro,
(2008); Matsudaira, (2008); and Lemieux and Milligan, (2004).
For the first question focused on welfare, a probit model controlling for widely
accepted correlates of poverty as in equation 1 provides a starting point.
Prob(P = 1|X) = Φ(α0 ++α1Ti +Xiα2 + εi) i = 1, ....., N (1)
The dependent variable in this case is a binary indicator which takes on a value
of 1 if an individual is poor and takes a value of 0 otherwise. By poor we mean
individuals with per capita consumption expenditure at or below a pre-determined
poverty line. In equation 1, Xi are our control variables that affect the probability
an individual is poor. Included here are control variables that could affect the
probability of being poor. Our T variable is a dummy which takes a value of one
if an individual experienced the treatment while individuals who went through the
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old system are assigned a 0. Φ(.) in equation (1) indicates the standard normal
distribution. This probit model can also be used to check the effect of treatment
on the likelihood of being employed. In this case the dependent variable takes
on a value of 1 if an individual is employed and takes a value of 0 otherwise. εi
is the independent error term and is distributed N(0, σ). Treatment as defined
above is based on year of birth. Those born 1971 and later should pass through
the treatment (6-3-3-4 system). In contrast, those born before 1971 should pass
through the 6-5-4 system (control).
Poverty status is just one potential way of measuring welfare improvements
from treatment. Other measures or indicators are poverty severity, poverty gap,
per capita expenditure and wages. To estimate possible effects of treatment on
each of these other indicators, a linear model similar to equation 1 with respect
to control variables, can also be estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
as a starting point. Equation 2 depicts this simple model.
Yi = β0 + β1Ti +Xiβ2 + εi (2)
Here Yi is the welfare outcome of interest which could be poverty gap; poverty
severity; wages or PCE, and X is a vector of control variables.
In equation 1 and 2, α1 and β1 represents the effect of being exposed to treat-
ment. If Cov(Ti, εi) ̸= 0 then the probit estimate of α̂1 ̸= α1. Similarly our OLS
estimate ˆβOLS1 ̸= β1. Bias in the estimate of α1 and β1 is possible because the
treated sample is younger than the control sample and given standard trends in
the age earning profile, the treated sample on average will have less experience
leading to lower wages or higher probability of being poor. Similarly being younger
would mean the treated group will complete their school to work transition later
than the control group which may lead to an observed lower likelihood of being
employed.
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To mitigate this potential challenge and derive unbiased estimates of treatment
effects, we make use of a sharp regression discontinuity (RD) design. Specifically
for each individual i, a random variable Yi represents the outcome of interest
10
while the scalar regressor xi is the running variable that determines treatment
assignment based on a cutoff. In our case, year of birth is the running variable
and cutoff occurs at 1971. We estimate local average treatment effects (LATE)
exploiting exogenous variation in system participation based on year of birth.
In our implementation of the sharp RD design, we assume the probability of
treatment changes somewhat deterministically from zero to one at the 1971 year
of birth cutoff. Students born from 1971 onwards were exposed to the treatment
while those born before 1971 typically would be exposed to the previous system
(6-5-4). We focus on large-sample inference for the average treatment effect at the
cutoff (which we define as c). Meaning that identification of the effect of exposure
to 6-3-3-4 is based on comparing the outcomes of treated students born in 1971
and just to the right of this cutoff, with those of students born just to the left of the
1971 cutoff. Given the program was initiated in 1982 when those born in 1971 were
about to enter secondary school, the year of birth which is the basis of the cutoff
cannot be manipulated. Hence year of birth near cutoff should not introduce
sharp differences in unobserved variables that affects an individual’s economic
welfare. This allows us to deduce causal interpretation related to treatment for
this subpopulation.11 It is important to note that our estimates are the average
effect for a subpopulation with covariate value close to xi = c. This method of
identification is similar to a local randomized experiment. One limitation of the
RD method is its limited degree of external validity. With this method, we cannot
10In our case we have multiple outcomes of interest including poverty status, employment status
and wages.
11Meaning we are able to achieve internal validity.
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estimate the overall average effect of the 6-3-3-4 system.
3.2 RD Implementation Challenges
The challenge in the implementation of the sharp RD design in our case is the small
potential for wrong assignment. This occurs typically with delayed enrollment or
grade repetition. For example an individual born in 1970 with our method of
assignment would be classed as passing through the 6-5-4 system. However if
this student repeated 3rd grade they would enter secondary school at the same
time as those born in 1971 and would have been treated. We do not worry too
much about this possible misassignment since grade repetition is not common in
Nigeria and in a large sample would not be able to drive results. As noted above
about 4.5% of students in our sample have repeated a grade. This could occur
at the primary or secondary level hence the chance that we get individuals in our
sub-sample who repeated a grade at a time when it would lead to misassignment
to the control group is slim. Another possible concerning confounding factor is
delayed or early enrollment. If a child delayed enrollment to primary 1, then
they also could be exposed to treatment even though born before 1971.12 We
provide ways of testing for program effects taking into accounting this possible
confounding factor in program assignment close to the 1971 cutoff. Specifically
we use information in the survey on when individuals started school. Hence as a
robustness check, we implement the RD approach dropping students who started
school after 8 years and reassigning to treatment those who were born in 1970
and 1969 and started school late enough to experience treatment. We refer to this
sample as the restricted sample later on in the results section.13.
12It is also possible for a child to start primary school early before age 5 but this is not common
so we do not worry about this.
13It is important to note that not everyone answered this question so it is possible a negligible
number of individuals started school late and remain in the sample misassigned even in the
restricted sample.
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Another potential issue that could invalidate our RD design is if there is an un-
observed variable that is correlated with treatment and also welfare. One possible
factor that one may needs to worry about especially given the significant changes
in economic conditions in Nigeria over time is economic/labor market conditions
upon graduation. If the distribution of labor market/economic conditions faced
by individuals when they graduated on average differ across treatment and con-
trol group around the cutoff used in the RD estimation then our local average
treatment effect (LATE) may be biased. This is because such labor market condi-
tions potentially have long term effects on individual’s labor market outcomes and
welfare, independent of treatment. To check for possible issues with economic con-
dition upon graduation, we obtain constant Gross Domestic Product per Capita
(GDPC) data for Nigeria from the World Bank from 1960-2010. We then compute
GDP per capita growth rates and find the mean GDPC for the sample close to
the 1971 cutoff at high school graduation (about age 18)14 Our computed mean
GDPC for the treated and control group for the whole sample and around the
cutoffs are not statistically different. Meaning on average participants of both
programs faced similar economic growth conditions at age 18.
Another potential confounding factor that may be relevant to a subset of the
sample is the timing of the inception of universal primary education (UPE) in some
parts of Nigeria. Osilli and Long (2008) and Uwaifo Oyelere (2010) discuss this
free primary education program in detail. While the Eastern and Western parts
of Nigeria were exposed to free education before 1976, all the Northern regions
were exposed to free primary education for the first time in 1976. Coincidentally
1976 is the year when the first set of those in the treatment sample begin primary
school. Since free education can stimulate school enrollment and higher attainment
14We pick economic conditions at high school graduation/age 18 because the bulk of individual
in Nigeria enter the labor market on or before this time.
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which can have effects on welfare over the long-run, then for a part of the sample
around the cutoff, there exists a difference in exposure to free education at school
entrance age for treatment and control group. We do not worry to much about
this potential confounding factor because this issue is only a source of concern
for our estimated effects using the whole sample because it induces differences in
the likelihood of enrollment in school for a small sub-sample in the control and
treatment group. However when we restrict the sample to those whose highest
qualification is at the secondary level, which is our most relevant sample, this issue
is irrelevant because for both treatment and control group the sample is restricted
to individuals who attended school. Since these individual attended school, there
is no difference in the likelihood of school enrollment around the cutoff for this
subgroup as this probability is equal to 1 for participants in both the old and the
6-3-3-4 system.
3.3 RD Estimation Implementation
To provide evidence of the impact of 6-3-3-4 using sharp RD design, we estimate
LATE using a local polynomial nonparametric RD treatment-effect point esti-
mator. Specifically, we following the approach proposed in Calonico, Cattaneo,
and Titiunik (2014b).15 One advantage of this approach is that it allows us de-
rive robust statistical inference.16 We implement this approach in STATA using
the command rdrobust provided by CCT(2014a). Using this command, treatment
effects are derived using a local linear estimator with a local quadratic bias correc-
tion and a triangular kernel. Variance estimators employed in the estimation are
those proposed in CCT(2014a) and are computed using three nearest neighbors.
One of the many benefit of using the rdrobust command for estimating treatment
15Hereon CCT.
16In particular, the bias-corrected inference procedure proposed in CCT(2014b) is robust to
large bandwidth choices.
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effects in a sharp RD is that robust bias-corrected confidence intervals (CIs) for
the average treatment effects at the cutoff can be easily computed.
Figure 5 captures the RD plots for the different measures of poverty we con-
sider in our analysis while Figure 6 captures plots for wages and share employed.
To construct these plots, we make use of the rdplot command provided by CCT
(2014b). Employing a nonparametric partitioning estimator, RD plots are con-
structed using evenly spaced binned sample means that trace out the underlying
regression function. The number of bins for the RD estimate plot is obtaining
using the integrated mean squared-error (IMSE)-optimal evenly spaced method
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Figure 5: RD Plots: Poverty Measures by Treatment Status
Figure 5a shows RD poverty status plots using the dollar per day (DPD)
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measure. Figure 5b shows the RD poverty gap plot and Figure 5c shows the RD
poverty severity plot. We also construct RD plots for wages and share employed
(see Figure 6a and 6b). Figure 5a provides evidence of a discontinuity at year
1971 while Figure 5b and 5c provide less clear evidence. Similarly, while Figure
6a shows a discontinuity at the 1971 cutoff, the gap is somewhat less clear than
the discontinuity for employment in figure 6b. However one observations from
these plots is that given the gap at the cutoff is not large, we cannot conclude
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Figure 6: RD Plots: Wages and Employment by Treatment Status
We also construct RD plots for the sample where treatment effects should be
most discernable (individuals whose highest qualification is at the secondary level).
Figure (7a) shows the discontinuity for poverty status while Figure (7b) shows the
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discontinuity for wages and Figure (7c) depicts the RD plot for share employed.
Notice that the discontinuity is clearer for wages and poverty status in these figures
(7a and 7b) compared to similar plots for the whole sample presented in Figures
(5a) and (6a). For employment there does not appear a clear discontinuity at
the cutoff in Figure (7c) and the discontinuity appears more apparent in Figure
(6b) for the general population than in the sub-sample. Finding bigger gaps
at the cutoff for this sub-sample in wages and poverty status is consistent with
the likelihood of finding discernable impacts of the system for individuals whose
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Figure 7: RD Plots: Wages and Employment by Treatment Status
31
3.4 Confidence Intervals and Bandwidth Selection
One benefit of using the rdrobust command of CCT (2014) for estimating treat-
ment effects in a sharp RD is that robust bias-corrected confidence intervals (CI)
for the average treatment effects at the cutoff can be easily computed. This
is important because typically in practice, confidence intervals are constructed
assuming away potential bias of the estimator. However, as CCT (2014) note,
making such an assumption is only justifiable if the smoothing leading bias of the
RD estimator is small which requires choosing a smaller bandwidth than the Mean
Square Error (MSE)-optimal one. In empirical research this choice is typically not
made and the potential effect of the leading bias on the performance of confidence
intervals is ignored.
In our estimation using the rdrobust command, the conventional CIs described
above are presented alongside two other alternative approaches to constructing
confidence intervals. The first of these approaches commonly employed in the
nonparametric literature uses bias correction. The problem with the bias cor-
rection approach for constructing CIs is that it has poor finite-sample properties
making it less preferable for empirical research. The second alternative approach
was proposed by CCT (2014b) and produces robust CIs. The difference with this
latter approach and the bias corrected CI is the use of a different variance es-
timator(see CCT (2014) for details). The advantage of this approach is that it
offer superior finite sample performance and allows for the use of MSE-optimal
bandwidth choices.
In summary, we derive using CCT (2014) estimated effects of treatment using
two point estimators and three CIs. The first estimated effect is derived using a
linear local polynomial estimator and conventional CIs are estimated. The second,
estimated effect is derived using a linear local polynomial with a 2nd order local
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polynomial bias correction and bias corrected CIs are estimated. The last estimate
is derived using the second estimator but the robust bias corrected CIs suggest
by CCT (2014) highlighted above. Our inference will be derived using the bias-
corrected estimator alongside the robust bias corrected CI.17
We derive the LATE of system participation following the RD procedure high-
lighted above first using the main sample, and then the restricted sample. To
recap, this restricted sample drops those who start school after 8 (these indi-
viduals are typically different) and in this sample we correct for those who get
misassigned to the control group because of late school enrollment. As we noted
above, given the significant changes with the 6-3-3-4 system compared to the prior
system were at the secondary level, we also derive estimates restricting the sample
to the sub-sample whose highest qualification is at the secondary level. As noted
above, this is the sample where treatment effect should be most noticeable. In
this sample, those with tertiary education, just primary education and secondary
without any qualification get dropped. We also estimate LATE on the aforemen-
tion secondary sub-sample, adding on the conditions imposed in the restricted
sample. We also conduct some robustness checks using other sub-samples. The
challenge with many of the sub-sample analysis is that the sample size becomes
small which makes it more difficult to identify effects and deduce inference cor-
rectly. For example when the sample size is small, estimated standard errors are
large and finding insignificant estimates is likely. In the next section we present
the LATE estimates across different measures of welfare and provide inferences.
17The robust bias corrected CI is calculated using the variance estimator suggested by CCT
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4 Results
Table 3 presents the estimates of the treatment effect using the rdrobust command
as described above. column (1) summarizes the results for poverty status based
on a dollar per a day (DPD) poverty line. This line is used to demarcate abso-
lute/extreme poverty and is our preferred poverty line. Column (2) summarizes
the results for poverty gap based on the aforementioned poverty line and column
(3) summarizes the results for poverty severity using DPD. Columns (4)-(6) are
similar to columns (1)-(3) but a higher poverty line is employed. This line is
called the Relative Poverty line (RPL) in Nigeria and is set at N66,802.20 in the
year of the survey(about a dollar and twenty five cents). While the DPD poverty
line identifies the extreme poor. This line general separates the poor from the
non-poor in the Nigerian context.
As discussed about estimates using the three methods (conventional, bias cor-
rected and robust) are presented. The results in Table 3 suggest that those exposed
to the treatment (6-3-3-4) had about a 6.7% lower probability of being in extreme
poverty. Focusing on the robust method, exposure does not appear to reduce the
severity of poverty. We also find some evidence that exposure leads to a smaller
poverty gap when we consider the RPL. This result is consistent with finding a
significant effect on poverty status using the more conservative absolute poverty
line (DPD).
Table 4 panel A presents the results using the restricted sample as defined
above. In Panel B we present results for a sample dropping all those who begin
school after 6 years. The restriction on the sample in panel B has pros and cons.
First, it might be useful to drop those who delayed entry to school because they be
different from others and on average exhibit lower welfare outcomes regardless of
treatment. However, starting school late is common in the rural areas in the past
34
Table 3: Are individuals who passed through the 6-3-3-4 system less likely to be
poor? Estimates using RD
Poverty Poverty Poverty RPL Poverty RPL Poverty RPL Poverty
Method Status Gap Severity Status Gap Severity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conventional -0.059** -0.022 -0.008 -0.032 -0.027* -0.014
(0.029) (0.015) (0.010) (0.028) (0.016) (0.012)
Bias-corrected -0.067** -0.025* -0.007 -0.038 -0.032* -0.016
(0.029) (0.015) (0.010) (0.028) (0.016) (0.012)
Robust -0.067** -0.025 -0.007 -0.038 -0.032* -0.016
(0.034) (0.017) (0.012) (0.033) (0.019) (0.014)
Observations 5,145 5,409 7,225 5,409 5,145 6,340
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: In columns (1)-(3) estimates based on $1 per day poverty line.
and dropping these observations which are substantial could lead to estimates that
may not be valid for the sub population we are interested in. The results in Panel
A suggest that in the restricted sample, on average exposure to treatment does
not seem to reduce poverty likelihood, poverty gap and poverty severity in most
specifications. While we find treatment reduces the probability of being extremely
poor using the second method (bias corrected), this is not our preferred method
given its limitations in small samples. In contrast in when we drop all students
who enrolled late in school (panel B), we find significant treatment effects. Notice
the significant reduction in the sample over which the estimates are derived when
we drop those who enroll late. The results in panel B suggest that treatment leads
to a 9.8% reduction in the probability of being poor and also reduces the poverty
gap using both poverty lines and poverty severity using the RPL. The contrast in
estimates in panel A and B may suggest that on average student who begin school
after 6 may be different.
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Table 4: Does the 6-3-3-4 system Reduce Poverty Risk? RD estimates with Re-
stricted Samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Method Poverty Poverty Poverty RPL Poverty RPL Poverty RPL Poverty
Status Gap Severity Status Gap Severity
Panel A: Excludes those who begin school after 8
Conventional -0.048 -0.011 -0.005 -0.026 -0.020 -0.008
(0.030) (0.015) (0.011) (0.030) (0.017) (0.012)
Bias-corrected -0.055* -0.012 -0.004 -0.031 -0.023 -0.008
(0.030) (0.015) (0.011) (0.030) (0.017) (0.012)
Robust -0.055 -0.012 -0.004 -0.031 -0.023 -0.008
(0.035) (0.017) (0.012) (0.035) (0.020) (0.014)
Observations 4,927 6,161 6,161 4,927 4,927 6,161
Panel B: Excludes those who begin school after 6
Conventional -0.085** -0.036* -0.020 -0.039 -0.040* -0.027*
(0.039) (0.018) (0.013) (0.036) (0.021) (0.015)
Bias-corrected -0.098** -0.040** -0.023* -0.048 -0.045** -0.031**
(0.039) (0.018) (0.013) (0.036) (0.021) (0.015)
Robust -0.098** -0.040* -0.023 -0.048 -0.045* -0.031*
(0.044) (0.022) (0.015) (0.042) (0.024) (0.017)
Observations 2,775 3,628 4,280 3,441 3,441 3,628
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In columns (1)-(3) estimates are based on $1 per day poverty line.
Table 5 highlights our other potential measures of welfare (wages, PCE and
employment). The first three columns summarize the results for the full sample
while the last three columns summarize the results for the restricted sample as
described above. Given only a small sample earn wages, the sample size for this
analysis is much smaller than the samples we employ in estimating effects for other
measures of welfare we consider. Panel A summarizes treatment effects for wages,
per capita expenditure and employment. While Panel B focus on estimates using
log wages and log PCE. These results provide no evidence that treatment affects
wages or PCE on average using our preferred method. Even when we use log wages
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and PCE, we only see significant treatment effects when we use the bias corrected
method. In contrast, our results suggest significant effects on employment. Those
exposed to the treatment are 5.3% more likely to be employed than the control
group. If we exclude all those who begin school after 6 years as we did in Panel B
of Table 5, we find no evidence of treatment affecting wages, PCE or employment
probability.18 This is in contrast to finding significant effects of treatment on
poverty measures in the sub-sample where late enrollers are dropped.
Table 6 presents the results for the sample we expect to see discernable effects.
This is the sample focused solely on individuals whose highest qualification is at
the secondary level. Panel A focuses on the full sample of these individuals while
Panel B focuses on a sub-sample of these individuals who satisfy the conditions for
the restricted sample. We find negative treatment effects using our robust method
for poverty incidence. As expected the magnitude of the effects are greater in this
sub-sample than the full sample. Specifically we find that treatment leads to a
decrease in the probability of being poor by 13.8%. We do not find significant
effects for poverty severity or poverty gap. When we look at the restricted sample
we do not find any significant effects using any method just as in Table 4 Panel
A. Given the possibility that this sample may have some bias, we drop all those
with secondary qualifications who enroll after 6 years (results not presented) and
estimates similar to those in Panel A are noted. However, for poverty incidence
based on DPD, we find significant effects of treatment using the conventional and
bias corrected methods but not our preferred robust method. The small sample
size in this analysis might explain this lack of significance using our preferred
method. The significant difference in estimates for the sample summarised in
Panel B compared to A and the sample where individuals who enroll late are
dropped, suggests potential selectivity issues with individuals who start school
18Results not shown but available on request.
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late. These individuals may be less motivated, lower achiever or poor which can
affect welfare independent of treatment. It is possible that when such individuals
are included in the treatment group it attenuates the probability of detecting
treatment effect.
Table 5: Does the 6-3-3-4 system lead to higher wages, PCE and employment?:
RD Estimates
Full Sample Restricted Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Wage/PCE/Employment
RD Method Wages PCE Employed Wages PCE Employed
Conventional 30,009.278 4,904.775 0.036* 21,545.100 2,414.295 0.047**
(20,742.465) (4,282.854) (0.021) (16,664.699) (4,887.196) (0.022)
Bias-corrected 29,912.323 4,001.712 0.038* 21,916.606 1,415.230 0.053**
(20,742.465) (4,282.854) (0.021) (16,664.699) (4,887.196) (0.022)
Robust 29,912.323 4,001.712 0.038 21,916.606 1,415.230 0.053**
(24,084.316) (5,001.856) (0.025) (19,206.581) (5,494.200) (0.026)
Observations 1,739 7,992 4,189 1,473 6,153 3,818
Panel B: Log Specifications
Method Log Wages Log PCE Log Wages Log PC
Conventional 0.173 0.050 0.050 0.030
(0.133) (0.044) (0.133) (0.048)
Bias-corrected 0.225* 0.046 0.099 0.029
(0.133) (0.044) (0.133) (0.048)
Robust 0.225 0.046 0.099 0.029
(0.153) (0.052) (0.155) (0.057)
Observations 1,617 6,744 1,572 6,153
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Does the 6-3-3-4 system Reduce Poverty Risk? Estimates for Secondary
Sample
Method DPD Poverty DPD Poverty DPD Poverty RPL RPL Poverty RPL Poverty
Status Gap Severity Status Gap Severity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Sample with a Secondary Certificate
Conventional -0.130** -0.039 -0.015 -0.033 -0.048* -0.025
(0.055) (0.025) (0.016) (0.058) (0.028) (0.019)
Bias-corrected -0.138** -0.043* -0.015 -0.019 -0.051* -0.026
(0.055) (0.025) (0.016) (0.058) (0.028) (0.019)
Robust -0.138** -0.043 -0.015 -0.019 -0.051 -0.026
(0.064) (0.030) (0.019) (0.068) (0.034) (0.023)
Observations 1,577 1,577 1,953 1,430 1,577 1,714
Panel B: Secondary Qualification and Restricted Sample
Conventional -0.056 0.002 0.010 0.007 -0.005 0.006
(0.064) (0.027) (0.016) (0.069) (0.032) (0.020)
Bias-corrected -0.053 0.002 0.011 0.024 -0.003 0.007
(0.064) (0.027) (0.016) (0.069) (0.032) (0.020)
Robust -0.053 0.002 0.011 0.024 -0.003 0.007
(0.077) (0.033) (0.020) (0.081) (0.039) (0.024)
Observations 1,295 1,435 1,435 1,120 1,295 1,435
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7 summarizes the results for the other measures of welfare we consider
for the sub-sample whose highest qualification is at the secondary level. Just as
in Table 6, panel A contains estimates derived using this sub-sample and panel
B is the restricted version of this sample. Focusing on the estimates using the
robust method, these results support the results in Table 6 Panel A and also
provide a channel through which the noted reduction in poverty incidence occurs.
These results suggests that treatment leads to higher wages of about 41,527 Naira
which is substantial. Using log wage this result suggests a 38.2% increase in
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wages.19 For the secondary sample we do not see any effect on employment which
is consistent with the lack of discontinuity in the RD plot (Figure 7c). In the
sample summarized in panel B where in previous estimation no effects have been
noted, we find significant treatment effects using log wages but not wages and the
estimated percentage increase in wages is larger 56.4%. Again we also estimate
these specifications on the sample in which we drop all individuals who enrolled
in school after 6 (results not shown) and find magnitudes similar to those in Table
7 panel A for wages and similar to those in panel B for log wages. The effect
of treatment on wages persist in this smaller sample using our robust method.
However, the effect on log wage is not significant in the robust method but is
significant in the bias corrected method.
19The log wage result is clearly significant in the first two methods and barely significant in
the robust method (P value 0.105).
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Table 7: Does the 6-3-3-4 System Lead to Higher Wages, Employment and PCE:
RD Estimates for Secondary Sample
RD Wages PCE Employed Log Wages Log PCE
Method (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Sample with Secondary Qualification
Conventional 31,679.708* -146.664 -0.054 0.335* 0.035
(18,968.552) (10,072.114) (0.046) (0.201) (0.093)
Bias-corrected 41,527.875** -2,649.244 -0.068 0.382* 0.017
(18,968.552) (10,072.114) (0.046) (0.201) (0.093)
Robust 41,527.875* -2,649.244 -0.068 0.382* 0.017
(23,324.115) (11,500.895) (0.053) (0.236) (0.109)
Observations 335 1,238 867 601 1,427
Panel B: Secondary Qualification and Restricted Sample
Conventional 23,435.425 -4,849.494 -0.011 0.482* -0.050
(14,329.486) (11,806.819) (0.046) (0.247) (0.110)
Bias-corrected 25,599.456* -4,490.188 -0.013 0.564** -0.061
(14,329.486) (11,806.819) (0.046) (0.247) (0.110)
Robust 25,599.456 -4,490.188 -0.013 0.564* -0.061
(19,495.566) (13,912.288) (0.055) (0.305) (0.131)
Observations 266 1,042 841 420 1,042
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results thus far have been mixed but can be summarized as follows. While
6-3-3-4 system may have been deemed a total failure by many, these result suggests
in its most conservative form that participants in this program are doing no worse
than those who passed through the previous system. Moreover for the sample
for which discernable effects are most likely- those whose highest qualification is
at the secondary level, there is some evidence of a lower rate of extreme poverty
(13.8%) and evidence of wage increases (38.2%). The noted positive effect on
wages for treatment provides a likely channel for the noted effects on poverty
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incidence summarized in Table 6.
4.1 Robustness Checks
One of the possible issues with examining the effect of the treatment on poverty
is that poverty status is based on PCE which is linked with households income
and not the income of an individual. In particular, if a married couple both earn
income in the household and one is in the treatment group and the other is not,
estimating the effect of treatment on PCE or poverty is more challenging because
the dependent variable is determined by both husband and wife who have different
treatment status. One way of dealing with this problem is to estimate a model
with only single individuals. For this subgroup, direct links between expenditure
and treatment may be inferred. The challenge for this estimation is sample size
as most of those close to the cutoff are married by 2010-the period of the survey.
Table 8 summarizes these results. The first three columns focuses on treatment
effects based on the whole sample of singles and columns (3) to (6) summarizes
the RD treatment effects for the restricted sample. Panel A summarizes estimates
using the DPD measures while Panel B summarizes results for wages, employment
and PCE. We are unable to derive estimates for those with secondary qualification
who are single because the sample size of those close to the cutoff are too small
for estimation. The results in Panel A suggest negative but insignificant effects of
treatment on poverty for single individuals using the robust (preferred) method.
However, we see positive significant effects of treatment on wages of single indi-
viduals.20 Finding positive effects on poverty status and wages is consistent with
the results we noted in the overall sample though the magnitude is larger for the
sample of single individuals. This result may suggest that the inference that ex-
20We also note significant effects when we use log wages instead of wages for the full sample
but not for the restricted sample.
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posure to 6-3-3-4 reduces poverty risk may be spurious. However further analysis
is needed to assert this given the sample size issue with this analysis.
Table 8: Do single individuals who passed through the 6-3-3-4 system have im-
proved welfare? RD Estimates
All Single Restricted Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RD Panel A: Poverty Measures
Method Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty
Status Gap Severity Status Gap Severity
Conventional -0.176 -0.121 -0.095 -0.176 -0.132 -0.103
(0.110) (0.083) (0.062) (0.122) (0.097) (0.073)
Bias-corrected -0.164 -0.143* -0.111* -0.153 -0.160* -0.123*
(0.110) (0.083) (0.062) (0.122) (0.097) (0.073)
Robust -0.164 -0.143 -0.111 -0.153 -0.160 -0.123
(0.131) (0.102) (0.078) (0.145) (0.117) (0.088)
Observations 974 308 268 1,387 416 416
Panel B: Other Welfare Measures
Wages PCE Employed Wages PCE Employed
Conventional 53,060.670* 10,493.970 0.089 49,381.217* -5,102.849 0.050
(30,447.207) (31,188.013) (0.143) (29,294.727) (33,147.654) (0.137)
Bias-corrected 59,589.631* 10,361.562 0.132 55,363.132* -9,101.583 0.085
(30,447.207) (31,188.013) (0.143) (29,294.727) (33,147.654) (0.137)
Robust 59,589.631* 10,361.562 0.132 55,363.132* -9,101.583 0.085
(33,838.464) (37,266.481) (0.179) (32,882.772) (39,270.044) (0.160)
Observations 155 306 268 144 485 488
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A preferred way of dealing with the aforemention issue of linking treatment
with poverty measures in households with dual or multiple earners is to focus
on households with only one earner. This method is preferred to restricting the
sample to those who are single because being single does not imply that the
household head does not live within an extended family household were income
is pooled. In households with only one income earner, we can link the treatment
of the household head (who is typically the income earner) to the noted PCE
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and poverty status. Table 9 provides a summary of the estimated treatment
effects for this sub-sample. For this sub-sample we cannot estimate the effect
on employment because all the individuals in this sample are employed. In this
analysis, although we also estimate effects on wages, we are most focused on the
effect of treatment on poverty measures which are in panel A and PCE which is
in panel B. These are the measures that typically are estimated from household
expenditure and could pose an empirical challenge in households with more than
one income earner where income earners can belong to different treatment status.
The results suggest significant effects of treatment. Specifically we find that 6-
3-3-4 reduces the probability of being poor. This result is robust to estimating
treatment effects on the restricted sample. The results in table 8 also suggest
increases in PCE for the treated sample but this effect is not significant in the
restricted sample. Notice this effect is larger than previous noted effects in Table
3 and 4. What these results may suggest is that earlier results for the effect of
treatment on poverty risk were downward biased because treated individuals might
have also had a non-treated member in the household which may have attenuated
PCE.
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Table 9: RDD: Does exposure to 6-3-3-4 system improve welfare? (Single earner
households) Robustness Checks
All Single Restricted Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Poverty Measures
Method Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty
Status Gap Severity Status Gap Severity
Conventional -0.235*** -0.119** -0.042 -0.192** -0.053 -0.001
(0.085) (0.046) (0.030) (0.088) (0.047) (0.030)
Bias-corrected -0.278*** -0.143*** -0.056* -0.237*** -0.074 -0.011
(0.085) (0.046) (0.030) (0.088) (0.047) (0.030)
Robust -0.278*** -0.143*** -0.056* -0.237** -0.074 -0.011
(0.094) (0.051) (0.033) (0.099) (0.052) (0.034)
Observations 691 691 762 626 691 948
Panel B: Other Welfare Measures
Method Wages PCE Log PCE Wages PCE Log PCE
Conventional 84,561.466 24,318.252* 0.365** 57,897.233 17,640.497 0.142
(84,441.308) (12,985.053) (0.151) (65,596.275) (12,936.297) (0.148)
Bias-corrected 95,128.685 25,003.626* 0.435*** 52,391.865 16,815.134 0.196
(84,441.308) (12,985.053) (0.151) (65,596.275) (12,936.297) (0.148)
Robust 95,128.685 25,003.626* 0.435*** 52,391.865 16,815.134 0.196
(101,478.016) (14,870.314) (0.168) (77,190.441) (14,653.600) (0.167)
Observations 398 1,107 762 432 1,009 749
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Our last robustness check is an attempt to estimate average treatment effects
taking into consideration a common issue of unequal treatment of men and women
in the labor market. Furthermore many women in Nigeria do not work outside the
home so estimating treatment effects on the sample of men solely has value. These
results are summarized in Table 10. Specifically in Table 10 we present estimated
LATE on poverty measures in Panel A and in Panel B we present estimates on
employment, log wages and log PCE. In columns (1)-(3) estimates for all males are
presented and in columns (4)-(6) estimates for those with secondary qualifications
are presented. While we could not derive estimates for the sample of those whose
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highest qualification is at the secondary level when we considered single individuals
and single earner households because of small sample size, when we consider all
males, we have a large enough sample size so estimates for this sub-group can
be derived. These results suggest that treatment leads to a 27.5% reduction in
the probability of being poor for males with a secondary qualification. This is
a significant effect of the system and relatively similar to the estimated impact
noted when we consider single earner households. For the general population,
we find negative but insignificant effects. If we focused solely on the sample of
males that meet the requirements for our restricted sample(results not shown) we
find negative but insignificant effect of program on poverty incidence. However
if we dropped all those who enroll in school after 6 (results also not shown) we
find significant estimates similar to those we find in the non-restricted sample. In
particular we find that treatment leads to a 25.3% reduction in poverty likelihood
for those with secondary qualifications.
Panel B summarizes the results for other poverty measures. We show only the
results for log wage, employment and log PCE for brevity. We are particulary
interested in the results for wages and employment because unlike poverty mea-
sures, treatment can be linked directly with individuals’ wages. We find evidence
that treatment increases wages for males by 36.8% and for males with secondary
qualification, wages increase by 63.9%. The estimated effect on wages for males
with secondary qualification is twice the effect on the whole population (males and
females) in panel A of Table 7. We do not find any significant effects on employ-
ment among males generally and among males with secondary qualification. If we
use the restricted sample (results not shown) we find insignificant effects on wages
for males in the general but in the sample with only those with secondary qualifi-
cation, we find significant negative effects of treatment on males (wage increase of
64.3%). In particular this estimate is similar to the estimate we find in Panel B,
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column (5). In monetary terms our result in Table 10 suggests that participation
in the 6-3-3-4 system led to wage increases for males whose highest qualification
is at the secondary level of about 32,536 Naira a year.21 Which amounts to about
$216 dollars per year (using an approximate 2010 dollar to Naira exchange rate).
In contrast, similar analysis on both males and females in Table 7 column(4) panel
A suggests a wage increase of 15,406 Naira. This difference in finding may sug-
gest heterogeneity in the impact of treatment by gender. However more analysis
beyond the scope of this paper is needed to assert this possibility.
Table 10: Robustness Checks: Do Males Who Pass Through the 6-3-3-4 system
Experience Welfare Improvement?
RD Method All Males Males Secondary Qualification
Panel A: Poverty Measures
Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty
Status Gap Severity Status Gap Severity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conventional -0.045 -0.014 -0.002 -0.259*** -0.065* -0.013
(0.038) (0.019) (0.014) (0.079) (0.038) (0.025)
Bias-corrected -0.033 -0.008 0.003 -0.275*** -0.074* -0.016
(0.038) (0.019) (0.014) (0.079) (0.038) (0.025)
Robust -0.033 -0.008 0.003 -0.275*** -0.074 -0.016
(0.044) (0.023) (0.016) (0.094) (0.046) (0.030)
Observations 3,150 3,447 3,447 641 686 854
Other Welfare Measures
Employed Log Wages Log PCE Employed Log Wages Log PCE
Conventional -0.018 0.292 0.024 -0.032 0.541* 0.082
(0.027) (0.190) (0.072) (0.063) (0.282) (0.124)
Bias-corrected -0.024 0.368* -0.002 -0.046 0.639** 0.070
(0.027) (0.190) (0.072) (0.063) (0.282) (0.124)
Robust -0.024 0.368* -0.002 -0.046 0.639** 0.070
(0.031) (0.219) (0.082) (0.073) (0.325) (0.146)
Observations 1,533 801 2,752 486 288 850
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
21Mean wages for males with secondary education in 2010 was $50917.
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5 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we considered the impact of the 6-3-3-4 system in Nigeria on welfare.
This program was viewed by many as a flop leading to its replacement in 2006.
Given the program’s goal of building self-reliant graduates through relevant edu-
cation that has the potential to increase human capital accumulation, we focus on
two question that allow us test to what extent this goal was achieved. Specifically
we investigate if the 6-3-3-4 system participants experience welfare improvement
in comparison to those who passed through the 6-5-4 system. We also consider if
participants of this educational system are more likely to be employed given its
emphasis on technology and building self-reliant graduates.
We examine several measures of welfare improvement. Specifically we consider
poverty incidence, poverty gap, poverty severity, wages and PCE. We estimate
LATE effects of treatment on these measure using an RD design suggested by
CCT (2014) and the inference procedure and implementation command provided
by the same authors. Using this command we derive estimated effects of treatment
on the aforementioned indicators using a local linear polynomial estimator with
a quadratic local polynomial bias correction. Given program participation is not
based on choice but on year of birth, we do not worry about selectivity linked with
choice. We derive estimates of treatment for the general population and for several
sub-samples. In particular we are interested in the effect of treatment on those
whose highest qualification is at the secondary level. This is the sample for which
discernable effects of treatment, if they exist, are most likely to be found given
most of the system changes that could affect welfare were implemented at this
level. Our preferred results are based on the estimated effects for this sub-sample.
We conduct several robustness checks including estimating system effects on
the sample of those who are single, households with just one income earner and
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males. Given some students enroll in school late and the rule of assignment to
treatment which is year of birth would assign them to the control group instead
of the treatment group, we also attempt to address the issue of misassignment
close to the cutoff by creating a restricted sample in which we drop all who enroll
after age 8 and reassign those who enroll at 7 and 8 who could be affected by this
issue. However we are somewhat concerned with this sub-sample because of the
select nature of those who enroll in school late. Given on average such individuals
typically have lower welfare indicators, including them in treatment at the cutoff
could attenuate our finding any effects of program participation.
Our results suggest that there is some evidence of welfare improvement from
6-3-3-4 especially at the secondary level. In particular if we consider the whole
sample, our results suggest a 6.7% reduction in the probability of being in extreme
poverty and for those with secondary qualification solely we find a 13.8% reduction
in the probability of being in extreme poverty. If we consider households with
single earners for which drawing a link between treatment and poverty status
is more persuasive, we find effects of larger magnitudes (27.8% reduction). We
trace the channel of this impact on poverty by looking at the effect on wages.
Our results suggest no significant effects on wage in the general sample but an
increase of about 41,530 Naira in the secondary graduates sample. We do not
find consistent evidence of a statically increase in employment for participants of
the 6-3-3-4 system although many of the estimate are positive.22. While we find
some evidence of increase in PCE and a reduction in the poverty gap and severity
among the treated group in some samples, in most cases non-significant effects are
noted.
The results from our analysis are important because the 6-3-3-4 system got
22The exception being in Table 5 when we focus on the restricted sample and find significant
positive effects on employment of about 5.3%.
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changed to another education system 9-3-4 in 2008 without any critical evaluation
of the 6-3-3-4 systems impacts. Rather, anecdotal evidence and qualitative evi-
dence suggesting the program was a total failure played a significant role in getting
the system dropped. In November 2014, the 9-3-4 system got modified with the
introduction of the 1-6-3-3-4 education policy. There is suggestive evidence that
this change was again made without significant quantitative evaluation. Given
this trend, providing the first quantitative evaluation of the 6-3-3-4 system de-
spite the limitations in the analysis with respect to external validity is useful. The
few in support of the program have argued that the issue with the program was
not the objectives of the 6-3-3-4 system, its process, action steps, setup or con-
tent but rather its poor implementation (Fafunwa 2005). Our results support this
position. Despite claims of poor implementation of the program in many schools,
our results suggest that there is evidence of some positive effects at the level most
of the education system’s changes were focused on (secondary education).
As discussions are still underway to develop a new education policy in Nigeria,
it is important that policymakers are made aware of the need for good quantitative
evaluation of an education system before change. A program or system change
is costly not only for the tax payer but for the consumers of education and such
a change should only be undertaken after careful evaluation. Our paper is just
a starting point that we hope will propel more quantitative analysis of this past
system. In our paper, the extent to which we are able to fine tune the sample of
our treated and control group has been limited by sample size. Hence we are a
bit reluctant to claim our results capture the full effect of the system on reducing
poverty incidence and increasing employment even for secondary school graduates.
What our results suggest is that there are significant positive effects of exposure to
the 6-3-3-4 system especially for individuals at the secondary level and our results
are likely a lower bound. Moreover our results only provide LATE and the effect
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of the system on the population may be different. Finally, more empirical analysis
with detailed data on exposure to treatment and a larger sample of individuals in
the control and treatment sample is useful, and needed.
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